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Abstract-Due to the economic sanction the Russian 
Federation has taken a vigorous attempt to compensate the 
risk for the national economy stipulated by restriction with 
access to the capital markets and supply chain strategy by 
constraints to compete in international markets. Imposition 
of the special administrative regions is a respond to the 
sanctions by the United States and a few countries in order to 
minimize possible financial losses. In an uncertain recovery, 
supply chain operations need to be more scalable and flexible 
as they anticipate economic recovery and increase 
capacity.In practice, a special administrative area appears as 
offshore financial center. However, its goal is broader – to 
ensure the repatriation of capital withdrawn off the Russian 
jurisdiction in 1998-2018. The aim of study is to estimate the 
capital which will prospectively be returning to Russia until 
2025 through the special administrative regimes at Russkiy 
island and Oktyabr’skiy island in the Russian Federation. 
The findings show that the capital flight off the Russian 
economy has amounted to 653.2 billion US dollars for the last 
20 years. But viewing the result of sanction’s pressure, by 
2025, the total return of capital from the offshores at Cyprus 
and the Virgin Islands could prognostically reach 165.55 
billion dollars. Special administrative region’s preferences 
will motivate large foreign holdings, especially those that 
have fallen under sanctions, to change their registration to 
the Russia’s domicile. Therefore, the special administrative 
regions could prospectively facilitate investment inflow and 
stipulate recovering the Russia’s economy.  
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1. Introduction 
The economic crisis in Russia in 2008 caused capital 
flight about $10 billion, led to a sovereign default and 
revaluation of the public debt to 140% of GDP. That 
stipulated a jump in inflation by 85% and mass bankruptcy 
of the banks. After learning the lessons of previous crisis 
in 1998, due the economic growth in early 2000s when the 
oil prices were high, Russia’s government decided to 
accelerate repayment of public debt and to establish the 
Stabilization Fund. Therefore, by the beginning of the 
crisis in 2008, Russia’s debt was the lowest among the 
G20 countries (about 8% of GDP), and the Reserve Fund 
that inherited the Stabilization Fund and the National 
Wealth Fund jointly accumulated more than $170 billion 
(more than 10% of GDP). This allowed to Russia quickly 
set a comprehensive package of financial incentives at 5% 
of GDP. 
In the end of 2018, the Russia’s Central Bank noted 
increase in net capital outflow – by 2.7 times in annual 
terms – from 25.2 billion to 67.5 billion dollars. For 
comparison, net outflow in 2017 amounted $ 31.3 billion 
(by 1.6 times in 2016). The trend continued in 2019. For 
the first two months of 2019, the net export of capital from 
Russia by the private sector, according to the Central 
Bank, amounted 18.6 billion dollars, by 2.1 times to same 
period of 2018. Imposition the anti-Russian sanctions that 
set restrictive measures on lending to domestic enterprises 
abroad has led to the fact that a significant number of 
Russian exporters have been hampered by access to cheap 
borrowed funds abroad. Within the current structure of the 
economy, within the current quality of the institution, 
including the quality of public administration, Russia’s 
economy has no longer opportunity for a serious 
breakthrough.  
To support economic development the government 
represented a legislative regime so-called “special 
administrative regions” (SAR), whose residents are able to 
obtain the status of an "international company" and have 
various preferences, including accelerated registration, 
exemption from tax on the profits of their controlled 
companies, preferential rates on dividend income and 
some other benefits, including the terms of currency 
control by supply chain strategy. The goals of the SAR 
project initially were the capital repatriation and protecting 
national business from a foreign restrictive pressure.  
The legislation set rules for determining a tax basis for 
assets of companies that have received the status of an 
international firm, as well as foreign companies which 
recognized as a tax resident of the Russian Federation. 
Russia’s ministry of economic development, which 
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preferences will motivate large foreign holdings, 
especially those that have fallen under sanctions, to 
change their registration to the Russia’ domicile. But 
opponents are concerned about unequal business 
conditions in the Russian Federation and a possible mass 
re-registration of taxpayers, in fact, in the Offshore 
Financial Centers. 
Therefore, could the special administrative regions, i.e. 
Offshore Financial Centers, to restore the Russia’ 
economy? Does it facilitate finance’s repatriation and 
business re-domiciliation and under what conditions?  
 
2. Related literature  
A model of special administrative region is 
multidimensional. Special administrative regions (see 
Offshore Financial Centers) cannot be viewed as tax 
heavens only. It could encompass minimum formalities 
for incorporation, existence of an adequate legal 
framework that safeguard the integrity of principal-agent 
relations, a proximity of attracting capital to major 
economies, freedom from exchange controls, safeguarding 
assets from the impact of litigation. It appears as s 
financial system with external assets and liabilities out of 
proportion to domestic financial intermediation designed 
to finance domestic economies. More popularly, a center 
which provide some or all the following services: low or 
zero taxation, moderate or light financial regulation, 
banking secrecy and anonymity [1-4].  
The process of globalization by supply chain strategy 
has brought nations closer together and, apparently, 
increased the international mobility of corporate activity. 
Two aspects of globalization have had important and 
conceptually distinct implications: reductions in 
transportation and communication costs may make capital 
more mobile across jurisdictional boundaries, and 
financial innovation and liberalization may facilitate 
international tax avoidance by less footloose firms [6-10].  
Increased mobility of goods and services is apt to give 
rise to an erosion of corporate tax bases in high-tax 
industrialized countries, a decline in tax revenues and a 
rise in competition among governments. Using special 
administrative regimes countries attract and retain mobile 
investment and the associated tax revenues that may be 
induced to reduce tax rates below the levels that would 
obtain in the absence of mobility [4, 7]. Increased mobility 
can lead to a “race to the bottom” driving business tax 
rates to minimal levels, due to the fiscal externalities that 
mobility creates. These arguments notwithstanding, there 
appears to be very little evidence of a general decline in 
effective tax rates on capital in recent years [5]. 
A practical meaning of an Offshore Financial Center is 
a center where the bulk of financial sector activity is 
offshore on both sides of the balance sheet, (that is the 
counterparties of the majority of financial institutions 
liabilities and assets are non-residents), where the 
transactions are initiated elsewhere, and where the 
majority of the institutions involved are controlled by non-
residents [1]. The implications of financial mobility are 
more subtle. When firms may shift income to tax havens 
and other low-tax jurisdictions through financial 
transactions, real investment choices of firms and the tax 
policy environment of governments are changed [6].  
 Tax planning tends to make the location of real 
investment less responsive to tax rate differentials, even as 
taxable income becomes more elastic. While tax planning 
may reduce revenues of high-tax jurisdictions, therefore, it 
may have offsetting effects on real investment that are 
attractive to governments. In principle, then, the presence 
of international tax planning opportunities may allow 
countries to maintain or even increase high business tax 
rates, while preventing an outflow of foreign direct 
investment [11]. Financial mobility is manifested in the 
decisions of multinational enterprises to separate research 
and development and capital financing activities from 
production and sales of outputs, and so to engage in “tax 
planning” to realize income from intellectual property and 
from capital in jurisdictions different from those where 
real economic activities are located [12-14].   
 
3. Analysis method 
The aim of study is to assess a prospect for Russia’s 
special administrative regions, in terms of repatriation of 
capital due to the trade restrictions and sanctions imposed 
for business with Russian origin based on the supply chain 
strategy. It assumes that the special administrative regions 
cannot be viewed as tax heavens only. It encompasses 
simpler prudential regulatory frameworks that reduce 
implicit taxation, sets minimum formalities for 
incorporation, and, finally, attracts investment. 
Object of analysis is the volume of capital flight (i.e. 
capital outflow) off the Russia’s economy from 1998 to 
2018. The analysis follows the data according to the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation’s. Compared the 
amount of sovereign debt of Russia and the volumes of 
capital outflows off the national economy. To assess the 
impact of capital repatriation on the Russian economy 
used a prognostic projection which tracked the volume of 
the capital export and repatriation on example of two 
countries - Cyprus and the Virgin Islands for 2008-2018, 
and till 2025. It must be noted that both countries are 
popular offshore zones for the Russian business. 
 
4. Results  
The predominance of capital outflow over inflow in 
natural meaning called “capital flight”. In the context of 
our research, we consider the capital flight as spontaneous, 
unregulated export of capital by individuals and legal 
entities abroad in order to make their investment more 
reliable and profitable, as well as to avoid expropriation, 
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high taxation, and losses from inflation by supply chain 
strategy. In these areas, the supply chain strategy links the 
customers to sources and control the process to be clear 
which improve the economy fluency. In order to estimate 
the total outflow of capital off the Russia’s economy, we 
analyzed the volume of annual net capital flight from 2008 
till 2018 (figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Net Russia’s capital outflow/inflow in 2008-
2018, billion USD dollars (Source: The Central Bank of 
Russian Federation https://cbr.ru › statistics › 
credit_statistics › bop › outflow) 
 
According to results of the analysis for the banking 
sector and for other sectors, we can make some 
conclusions. For the whole period the net export of capital 
off the jurisdiction territory of the Russian Federation 
prevails. Notably, except for 2006 and 2007 when the 
capital inflows at $ 43.7 billion and $ 87.8 billion have 
been observed. These were relatively prosperous years for 
the economic system when the oil prices were high, and 
Russia’s government established the Stabilization Fund 
and the National Wealth Fund which jointly accumulated 
more than $170 billion. Totally for 20 years 653.2 billion 
dollars have been withdrawn off the national economy of 
Russia. The share of banking sector accounted by 33.14%, 
while other sectors accounted by 66.86%. 
In order to assume the trends of decapitalization of the 
economy and estimate stability of the financial system of 
the Russian Federation until 2025, we compared the 
volume of sovereign debt of the Russian Federation and 
volume of the capital outflow from 2008 till 2018 (figure 
2). Observing the statistics data of the Central Bank, we 
can make a few conclusions. The sovereign debt of the 
Russian Federation as of December 31, 2018 amounted to 
454.68 billion dollars. While net capital outflows for 20 
years have been amounted to $ 653.2 billion. Notably, 
over the past 8 years, the total outflow of capital amounted 
to 467.7 billion dollars, which more than the sovereign 
debt of the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that the 
net outflow of capital from Russia in January–November 
2019, according to the Central Bank, decreased from $54 
billion to $34 billion compared to the same period in 2018, 
however, the national economy has returned to the model 
of “flight of money” economy. 
 
 
Figure 2. Russia’s sovereign debt and capital outflows in 
2008-2018, billion USD dollars 
(Source: The Central Bank of Russian Federation 
https://www.cbr.ru/statistics/macro_itm/svs/;   
https://cbr.ru › statistics › credit_statistics › bop › outflow) 
 
Statistics on the payments balance by the Central Bank 
of Russia for October 2019 shows that after the capital 
increase of $ 1.3 billion in early autumn, then the private 
sector withdrew $6.7 billion off the country. In general, 
the outflow of capital, as in the crisis years, has become an 
avalanche (since April, more than 80% of the free 
currency has left Russia, of the sum which is a residual 
after import duties exemptions and payments on tax 
items). It appears as a systematic problem for the economy 
which is virtually impossible to prevent or stop. 
At first glance, the current outflow of capital does not 
really interfere with the economy. Inflation as a result of 
2019 is projected to be less than 4%, and GDP growth is 
estimated by some economic strategists at 1.5%. On the 
other hand, there is no more money in the people's pockets 
for consuming in a long-term period. According to the 
prime minister the individual’s real income at the end of 
the year has grown, but only symbolically by 0.2–0.3%.  
Notably, the Russia’s GDP has decreased since the 
imposition of sanctions, contracting by 2.8 percent in 
2015. While it is harder to causally link the impact of 
sanctions with Russia’s decline in economic growth, it 
appears that decrease in trade will be slowing down the 
country’s economic development. In context of our study 
it should be noted that establishing of special 
administrative regions has undertaken in respond to the 
sanctions to minimize losses and encourage business 
activities of “the national roots” - for non-residents and for 
the Russian companies.  
Therefore, Russia’s special administrative regions are 
considered as Offshore Financial Centers. Their 
jurisdiction encompasses a relatively large number of 
financial institutions engaged primarily in business with 
non-residents. In this research we consider a problem of 
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non-residents with Russia’s native origin that suffering 
excessive external pressure stipulated primarily by risks of 
sanctions. For political or economic reasons, the United 
States and several other countries impose trade restrictions 
and sanctions to protect their own markets. Then, a 
country against which the restrictions were imposed tends 
to look for a new market, paying more attention to the 
national economy, thereby attracting (i.e. returning) 
capital back to national market.  
The most severe restrictions on business activities 
were introduced in 2018-2019 against companies - 
metallurgy holding Rusal, IT company Yandex, national 
finance institution Sberbank, and the aircraft company 
Irkut.  
In order to find out the aftermath of sanction we 
analyzed these companies by criteria: type of activity, 
products, sanctions restrictions, consequences on the 
financial statements, threats and opportunities (table 1).  
 
Table 1. Impact of the sanctions on Russian companies 
Company Rusal Irkut Sberbank Yandex 
Operation 
and 
business 
activities 
Bauxite 
mining, 
aluminum 
production 
Aircraft 
industry/ 
Civil and 
defense 
aviation 
Private and 
corporate 
banking 
services 
IT, 
Internet, 
software 
and 
Internet 
industries 
Sanction 
restrictions 
20% duties 
on rough 
aluminum, 
closing of 
aluminum 
plant in the 
USA 
Restrictions 
on supply of 
engines, 
spare parts 
and materials 
for 
production 
and 
assembly in 
Russia 
Restrictions 
on purchase 
of public 
debt by 
foreign 
residents, 
the risks 
associated 
with the 
default of 
companies, 
debtors 
against 
whom 
sanctions 
are imposed 
Ban for 
foreign 
companies 
owning 
more than 
50% 
(20%) of 
the capital 
Sanction 
impacts 
Decrease in 
revenues 
and net 
profit, 
increase of 
costs, 
shrinking 
free cash 
flow 
Rapid 
growth of 
the 
expenditures, 
growth of 
other 
expenses, 
decrease of 
net profit 
Decrease of 
revenues, 
low net 
profit 
Decrease 
of 
revenues, 
low net 
profit 
Threats 
Sale of the 
controlling 
stake by the 
company's 
CEO, 
search for 
new 
markets 
and transfer 
the assets 
to Russia 
Raise of 
subsidies 
from the 
budget to 
finance the 
activities of 
core Russian 
enterprise; 
loss share of 
market 
The decline 
in assets 
slows down 
development 
Loss of 
market 
Analyzing the data in the table 3, we should make 
several conclusions. The core Russian sectors - mining 
industry, the aircraft assembling, the banking sector and 
the IT industry are suffering a great restriction on business 
activities. Being safe at the domestic market, they are 
under risks in the international markets. As a result, the 
prospects for development of some core economic sectors 
are uneven. Russia has adapted to sanctions and partially 
overcome their effects through a commercial 
diversification as well through massive budget 
investments into the public and commercial sectors. 
However, sanctions will be specifying a long-term effect 
on the future economic strategy of Russia by holding up a 
recovery of the economy. 
We should bear in mind that the legislation on 
“Russian offshores” was adopted in August 2018 for 
domiciling a foreign company - non-resident, at special 
administrative regions on Russkiy Island in Primorsky 
Territory and on Oktyabr’skiy Island in Kaliningrad 
Region. It is worth to note that the rules have frequently 
been perceived as benefits that are only available to 
persons subject to international sanctions. It is true that 
legislation stipulates several special rules for persons that 
face such “limiting measures”. However, companies that 
have not been affected by the sanctions may also register 
an international company in a special administrative 
region, thereby making the regime a universal tax 
planning tool. 
Two further facts should be underlined. Both territories 
of the SARs are islands which identified as having a 
special geopolitical significance. However, the law does 
not limit investments’ territorial allegiance by the areas of 
the two SARs only. So, it permits investing funds within 
the whole country. Besides, an international company can 
authorize an affiliated company to handle investments on 
its behalf. In addition, it is expected to exempt foreign 
branches of resident firms from taxes. Special 
administrative region’s preferences will motivate large 
foreign holdings, especially those that have fallen under 
sanctions, to change their registration to the Russia’s 
domicile.  
In order to assume the prospects of special 
administrative regions, we traced the Russia’s capital 
flows on example of two countries - Cyprus and the 
Virgin Islands for 2008-2018 (figure 3). It reasonably 
noted above that both countries are popular offshore zones 
for the Russian business. The analysis shows that at the 
end of 2018, $10.1 billion USD direct investment went 
back to Cyprus from Russia, according to data from the 
Central Bank. The negative balance of operations was the 
largest since 2008. Traditionally, investments from Cyprus 
and other offshore companies in Russia are financed with 
money of the Russian origin. Allocation of capital in the 
Cyprus jurisdiction has become less comfortable for 
Russians for several reasons. These are increased risks for 
                                                                                                                                                790 Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt Vol. 9, No. 2, April 2020 
 
Russian money due to possible sanctions that may lead to 
blocking of accounts. The second reason is increased 
regulatory pressure in Cyprus. 
 
 
Figure 3. Russia’s capital flows in Cyprus and the Virgin 
Islands, billion USD dollars 
 
To assess the impact of capital repatriation on the 
Russian economy a prognostic polynomial function used 
which tracked the volume of capital export and 
repatriation off Cyprus and the Virgin Islands till 2025 
(figure 4). It assumed that repatriation of capital can be 
carried out in a form of transferring home the capital 
previously withdrawn abroad, and its profits, as well as the 
proceeds in foreign currency from the sale of goods and 
services. 
 
 
Figure 4. Prognostic outflows from Cyprus and the Virgin 
Islands, billion USD dollars 
 
The analysis shows, by 2025, if the sanction pressure 
will be continuing, the total net “back flight” capital from 
these two countries could reach $ 165.55 billion. 
Therefore, we can expect an increase in capital 
investments and enhancing capitalization of the Russia’s 
economy.  Some offshore jurisdictions showed an influx 
of investments into Russia against the background of the 
outflow of Cyprus’s money. These include the Bahamas 
(plus $923 million), Bermuda (plus $814 million), and the 
Netherlands (plus $7.9 billion). Investment inflows from 
the UK (plus $2.5 billion), France (plus $1.1 billion), and 
Switzerland (plus $1.7 billion) were also recorded. In 
general, the positive balance of investments in Russia in 
2018 amounted to $8.8 billion - more than three times less 
than a year earlier. According to analysts of the Central 
Bank, this is due to a decrease in the returning of Russian 
capital from offshore zones. 
In the context of our research, we understand the term 
capitalization of the economy as a fundamental process, 
the economic meaning of which is to increase the cost of 
capital owned by not only non-residents but home 
companies too. It brings a result in recovering and overall 
growth of Russian economic system. In this regard, the 
mechanism of the special administrative region reduces 
the risks of doing business. 
 
5. Conclusion 
More scalable, variable cost supply chain operations 
have clear advantages over more traditional cost ones, 
especially when the economic recovery includes a high 
level of uncertainty and there is a risk of reentering a 
renewed recessionary period. There may be no better time 
than now for enterprises in any industry to consider 
adopting a more variable cost supply chain to limit risk 
and capture the most revenue growth opportunity. Number 
of resident-companies at the Russia’s special 
administrative regions in the end of 2019 is not 
impressive. According to experts the sooner the business 
is convinced of the absence of risks, the more actively it 
would use the tool, and the number of residents will be 
respectively growing.  The prognostic modelling for the 
capital back flow is just an assumption which points at 
high potential of the special administrative regions as 
multifunctional financial servicing zones. But the problem 
is that capital requires not only a safe tax haven, but also 
profitable returns on investments. In the current situation, 
when evidently there is a stagnation in the economy, it is 
quite difficult to find appropriate sectors for large-scale 
investments in a long-term view. Low consuming due to 
the low personal incomes remains a constraint factor, 
therefore, we should not expect a mass influx of 
investments from the foreign offshores. Another problem 
is the low efficiency of administration, which can affect 
delays in registration procedures for non-resident 
companies. Anyway, the first international companies 
were registered making the “Russian Offshores” a legally 
established fact, but time only tell whether these 
companies will be able to recover the economy in the 
current conditions. 
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